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Rapid and comprehensive reduction in barriers to international trade has often
been followed by a sharp deterioration in the current account (Dani Rodrik, 1990;
Rudiger pornbusch, 1987'~). The steep, S9 bUS deterioration in Mexico's current
account the 2 years after the trade reform process was accelerated in 1987 is only the
most recent example. The macroeconomic counterpart of the deterioration has
typically been a decline in private savings; no clear response pattern has been
observed for private investment. Economic theory has in recent years reached clear
conclusions on these matters; the problem with these conclusions is that they seem
counterfactual.
The problem does not really reside with investment. The investment response
will depend on rclative capital intensity of the industry whose protection is removed
compared to the sectors favored by trade liberalization. Putty-clay considerations
would tend to strengthen the investment response, as old capital gets scrapped more
quickly in response to changing relative prices. On the other hand, policy uncertainty
bestows an option value on assets more liquid than physical capital (Sweder van
Wijnbergen, 1985) and thus tends to depress investment. But with no clear prediction
emerging from economic theory, the ambiguous empirical record on this score is only
to be expected.2
But the situation is different with savings. In an elegant analysis, Assaf Razin
and Lars Svensson (1983) pointed out that a permanent reduction in tariffs affects
current and future goods in the same way, leaving intertemporal relative prices and
private savings unchanged. Gradual tariff reduction in fact raises the price of current
goods in terms of future goods and would thus tend to improve private savings
(Sebastian Edwards and van Wijnbergen [1986J make a case for gradualism in the
presence of capital market imperfections on this basis). It is this body of theory that,
for all its theoretical elegance, seems firmly at variance with the facts.
This paper starts from the observation that anticipated policy reversal may
explain a decline in private savings for the same reason gradual tariff reduction causes
private savings to go up. Temporarily low tariffs lower the relative price of current
goods in terms of future goods and thus tend to depress private savings.
However, thc possibility of poliry reversal does more than skcw intcrtemporal
relative prices towards today rather than tomorrow; it also increases policy uncertainty
per se. Is it possible that this increase in uncertainty reinforces the private savings
impact of an anticipated reversal of trade reform? This catmot really be analyzed in
the standard expected utility framework because risk aversion and intertemporal
substitution, two vcry different attributes of consumer preferences, are arbitrarily
confined to be inversely related in that framework. I show that, in the context of
imperfectly credible trade reform, this inverse relation implies that policy uncertainty
is unimportant when it would reduce private savings, and, when important, would tend
to increase private savings.
But this conclusion depends entirely on the inverse relation between risk
aversion and intertemporal substitution elasticity imposed arbitrarily by the framework3
of expected utility maximization. The "Ordinal Certainty Equivalence" (OCE)
approach introduced by Larry Selden (1978) offers a way out of the straightjacket
imposed by expected utility maximization. The OCE approach allows independent
parametrization of risk aversion and intertemporal substitution. Within the OCE
framework, I show that, with positive risk aversion, policy uncertainty will in fact
reinforce the negative savings impact of an anticipated policy reversal especially when
that negative impact is strong. This suggests that with high risk aversion and high
intertemporal substitution, a rapid uade reform that is not fully credible may depress
private savings significantly, with attendant negative impact on the current account.
This conclusion seems to accord well with actual experience.
I. The Model
There are two periods, 0 and 1. Thus the time consistency problems that naive
applications of the OCE approach lead to in multi-period setting (cf Philippe Weil,
1990) do no[ arise. Consumers consume home and foreign goods in each period. We
choose the home good as numeraire; and the exogenous world relative price of the
foreign good in terms of the home good is normalized to one. There is no tariff in
period zero; we have just entered a period of complete trade liberalization. But ~rr, the
probability that the old tariff (t, - 1) will be restored in the next period, is larger than
zero. Thus the future local price of the foreign good, T„ follows a binomial
distribution:4
(1)
Tl - tl with probability x
1 with probability 1-x
To simplify the structure of income effects, we assume that consumers have no
within period income, just wealth at the beginning of period 0, W,. Wealth is spent
today or tomorrow, and witliin each period on home goods h and imports m. Wealth
not spent in period 0 earns a certain rate of return R(the world rate of interest)
between period 0 and 1.
We assume homothetic, unit-elastic preferences accross goods within a time
Deriod.' Consumers know the within period tariff at the beginning of the period,
before allocating expenditure over home and foreign goods. We can therefore define
real consumption cxpenditure C, and the associated dual price index p, (a ""' indicates
an optimally chosen quantity):
Cl . (nl . m~Tl)IDl
P, ' ~
Ca is defined similarly. By assumption the fust period tariff is zero: To - 1. a is the
budget share of foreign goods in each period; a is constant because of the assumption
of a unitary within-period substitution elasticity.
Under these assumptions, the within-period budget identities are:
w,-o, pc,-w,
(3)
wy ~ ( wo - Co) R
The consumer choice problem presented here involves both intertemporal5
choice for given intertemporal prices, and response to risk. The standard expected
utility framework is unsatisfactory for this problem, because risk aversion and
intertemporal substitution, two very different attributes of consumer preferences, are
necessarily inversely related in that framework. This follows from the controversial
assumption, made axiomatically, of consumer indifference with respect to the timing
of resolution of uncertaínty about consumption lotteries (cf Larry Epstein and Stanley
Zin, 1989; and Weil, 1990).
We use the "Ordinal Certainty Equivalence" framework (Selden, 1978) to
disentangle risk aversion and intertemporal substitution. Under this approach, utility is
defined over the certain period zero consumption level and a certainty equivalent
measure of the uncertain period 1 consumption leveL This utility function is
characterized by an intertemporal substitution elasticity a- l~p. The certainty
equivalent of second period consumption is based on risk aversion parametrized by
the coefficient of relative risk aversion, y, which we assume to be strictly positive. This
results in a welfare function:
(4)
I~P 1
V - (Có-~ a ~ (ECi-r) i-r) 1-~
i
. (C'-~ r C'-o ) i-r
o ~ i,iu
i
with Cl,,~,~ ~ (E(Ci-r) ) '-r
C,,,,, can be interpreted as the certainty equivalent of the uncertain second period
aggregate consumption level, with y as the relevant risk aversion parameter. Using (2)
and (3) one can derive a simplified expression for C,:6
(5)
Wo ' Co 4( R) Cl
e Co t Cl ; R~ ' R
Raer ~
~ Ci`~r(Wo-Co)
R~,,, is the ex nost consumption rate of interest: the terms on which consumption today
can be substituted for consumption tomorrow. Since T, is stochastie, R~,,, is stochastic
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Then the certainty equivalent of C„ C,,,,,,, equals:
(~)
EClw ~ (Wo - Co)1-Y E(R~~l)
~ (W - C )'-~~1-r
o a
Maximizing V as defined in equ. (4) subject to the budget constraints (3) and using
equ.(7) yields for first period consumption C,:
(8)
i
Co ~ 1 iA Wo
or first period consumption is proportional to wealth. The proportionality factor
1~(ItA) depends on the risk adjusted rate of interest R„ the subjective time
preference discount factor (i and the intertemporal substitution elasticity:
i ~e).
(9i ,q . B o ~ n7
Trade policy reversal thus affects private consumption in period 0 entirely
through its impact on the risk-adjusted eonsumption rate of interest, R,. An inerea.ce
in this rate affects first period consumption:
(10)
ac, 1 A (1-P)
~ z-(liA)~~ P
~ V(P-1); 4 ) 0
If the intertemporal substitution is larger than one (p ~ 1), a higher risk adjusted
consumption rate of interest depresses private consumption.
II. Trade Reform Future Policv Reversal and Private Savines
Since all the effects of potential policy reversals work through the risk adjusted
consumption rate of interest, we first calculate this rate for the binomial distribution
over future tariff rates of equ. (1):
~
R, . (e( ~ )'w) 'w
i
i
~ R (lt1[(tyali-7)-1)) 1-r
Obviously, for y-0 this rate equals the expected rate:
(12)
R,.o ~ (1-f)R a xtl'R
~ R(E (tl'-1) tl)
It is instructive to separate the effect of potential future tariff increases through8
their impact on the exnected consumption rate of interest from their impact on
savings through increasing the variance of the consumption rate of interest. We
therefore look at the case of a fully anticipated trade policy reversal first, before
introducing uncertainty about it in the next subsection.
A. Anticipated Future Trade Policv Reversal and Private Savines
With full anticipation (~rr - 1), the risk adjusted rate of interest R, collapscs
into the expected rate for ~r - 1:
(13)
~
R, ~ R (1 .( ti. ci-il -1) 1'-Y
a Rti.
From (13), one can derive the impact of a fully anticipated trade policy reversal
(higher future tariffs) on R,:
(14) aR~ ~~..~ -~~-aRty
dti
(14) establishes the first point of this paper: an anticipated trade policy reversal (i.e.
an anticipation that future tariffs will exceed current tariffs) lowers the risk-adjusted
consumption rate of interest. Combining (10) and (14) then indicates how an
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Equ. (15) establishes the following proposition:
Proposition 1(IT effect); An anticipated rollback of trade liberalization leads to an
increase in current consumption (a decline in private savings) if the intertemporal
substitution elasticity exceeds 1 (p ~ 1)'~
B. Private Savings and Uncertaíntv about Future Trade Policy
Does uncertainty on future trade policy per se, for any given expected value of
future tariffs, '~ have an impact on first period consumption? Such an effect would
open up a second channel through which a trade reform with less than complete
credibility could affect private savings. This could be assessed by manipulating a and
t, so as to increase the variance for given expected value of the future dual price
index, p,. However, the particular structure of the model is such that this approach is
a difficult route towards establishing the link between trade policy uncertainty and
private savings. The first problem is that an increase in the variance of the expected
consumption rate of interest that preserves the mean would imply a complicated non-
linear restriction on t, and a(it requires keeping expression (12) constant). The
second problem is more serious, since it is more than just a technical complication
that could in principle be dealt with, like the 5rst. The problem is that the relation
between the variance and ~r is quadratic under the binomial assumption made in equ.10
(1) and has an interior maximum (the variance is proportional to -rr(1-~r)). This
relation can thus not be inverted to write I~ as a function of the variance rather than
of -rr itself. Different values of vr can yield the same variance of the expected
consumption ratc of interest, so there is no way -rr can be substituted out of the
expression for R, to write R, as a function of the variance instead. Moreover,
changes in -rr will have effects on the variance of the expected rate of interest that
differ in their sign dcpending on the initial value from which Tr is changing. Wc
therefore follow a different approach.
In the OCE framework, assuming y-0 eliminates all impact of uncertainty,
obviously without any impact on the ected consumption ra[e of interest. Thus an
analysis of the case for y-0 isolates the ptue expected reversal effect, with no
pollution by uncertainty per se. The impact of tmcertainty can then be assessed by
looking at the impact of increasing y. Increasing y leaves the expected consumption
discount rate unaffected, since it only involves a change in preferences, not in the
objective environment. It therefore does not have any effect on the impact of an
exnected reversal analysed in Section 3.1; in the OCE approach risk aversion and
intertemporal substitution can be separated. Therefore the impact of increasing y
from 0 is the impact of uncertainty at the value y has been increased to. Finally, since
the only uncertainty in the model is the uncertainty related to future tariffs, the entire
impact of the inerease in y is due to ihe eicisting uncertainty about future trade policy:
The impact of an increase in y would be zero if there was no tariff uncertainty.
Consider how an increase in y would affect first period consumption given the
stochastic structure outlined in (9). Once again, the entire impact of both uncertainty
and of increases in y runs through the impact on the risk adjusted interest rate. Thus11
consider the derivative of R, with respect to y. To this end we introduce some
simplifying notation. Define first the consumption discount rate in case of a zero
future tariff as R,,, and in the case of a positive future tariff as R~. Also, detine k as
k-1-y. This yields:
~
(16) RT - (aRi r (1-1[) Rx) ~
i
- (ER~) ~; i - L,X
E is the expectations operator over the distribution specified in equ. (1). Taking logs




k logRy - log(ERi)
E(R~ log(R ))
~ ~ . logR~ - k ~
E(R~)
Multiply both sides by k and rearrange terms to get:
(19)
E(Rik) ~ ~ ' ~ -
- E(R; log(Rj)) - E(R~)~log(ERj)
~ 0
The inequality in (19) obtains because of convexity of the function f(z) -zlog(z). Since
k- 1- y, equ. (19) establishes what we are after: '~12
~20~ dk--dy ~~ ~ 0 for all y
Thus introducing risk aversion in the presence of uncertainty about future trade
reform will unambiguously lower the risk adjusted consumption rate of interest,
something that it would not have done without the trade related uncertainty (since
there is no other source of uncertainty). We can therefore conclude that uncertainty
about future trade policy reversal will lower the risk adjusted consumption rate of
interest. But (10) states that a cut in the risk adjusted rate of interest will depress
private savings if thc intertemporal substitution ela.cticity is larger than one (p ~ 1).
Thus combining eyu. (10) and (20) yields proposition 2:
Prop9sition 2(Uncertainty effect): Uncertainty about future trade policy per se (i.e.
for given x e value of the tariff) will depress private consumption today if the
intertemporal rate of substitution exceeds one (p ~ 1).
Thus under the OCE approach the intertemporal substitution effect (IS) of
proposition 1 reinforccs the uncertainty effect (UE) of proposition 2 for all values of
p. If intertemporal substitution is high (p ~ 1), both the IS effect and the UE effect
increase private consumption; if intertemporal substitution is low (p ~ 1), both
depress private consumption. Moreover, this holds for all values of the risk aversion
parameter y. This contrasts with the expected utility approach, where the two effects
reinforce each other only when y ~ 1, i.e. when uncertainty is relatively unimportant
because risk aversion is low.13
III. Conclusions
This papcr starts from the observation that trade liberalization is often
followed by a strong surge of imports and an accompanying current account
deterioration. The macro-economic counterpart of this CA deterioration is typically a
decline in savings rather than an investment boom. We show first of all that
anticipation of reimposition of tariffs in the future lowers the expected consumption
rate of interest (makes current goods cheaper in terms of future goods). Therefore an
anticipated future tariff increase will increase current consumption if the
intertemporal substitution elasticity is larger than one. If consumers internalize the
impact of future tariff revenues on their after-tax income, the savings impact will
alwavs be negative, even for an intertemporal substitution elasiticity below one.
The second result concerns the impact of poliry uncertainty per se on private
savings. We separate the impact of ~~ shifts in intertemporal relative prices
from risk aversion by using the Ordinal Certainty Equivalence approach pioneered by
Selden (1978) and, for infinite horizons, by Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990).
This approach relaxes the rigid inverse relationship between intertemporal substitution
and risk aversion that characterizes the expected utility approach to consumer choice
under uncertainty. Within the OCE framework, we establish that policy uncertainty
per se wi11 further reduce private savings if: (a) there is positive risk aversion; (b) the
intertemporal substitution elasticity exceeds one.
This is an interesting result for two reasons. First it shows how policy
uncertainty about future tariffs will reinforce the negative savings impact of the direct
anticipated reversal effect exactly when the latter is large (intertemporal substitution14
ela.cticity is high). The two effects thus go into the same direction exactly when they
matter most. The second observation is more academic. In the standard expected
utility approach, risk aversion is low when intertemporal substitution is high, because
the relevant elasticities are each other's inverse. The consequence of this is that
whenever the uncertainty effect is important, the direct anticipation effect is not and
vice versa. This result is reversed in the non-expected utility approach, as we found
out: the two effects are complementary in the case where the direct anticipation effect
is important.
How relevant is all this from an empirical point of view? There is after all a
widely held belief that the intertemporal substitution elasticity is very low (p very
high), with some setting p as high as around 10 (Robert Hall, 1988). More recent
evidence using the Epstein-Zin approach to consumer choice under uncertainty has
however tended to come up with different results. Most relevant in this case are
maybe the results reported for Mexico in Patricio Arrau and van Wijnbergen (1991);
and Gil Bufman, Leo L.eidermann and van Wijnbergen (1991), since Mexico's
experience with trade reform was in fact what triggered this paper.
Arrau and van Wijnbergen (1991) and Bufman, Leiderman and van Wijnbergen
(1991) find values for p between 0.24 and 0.8 depending on whether money services
are accounted for in the measure of consumption or not, indicating a substitution
elasticity well in excess of 1. With money services incorporated, the implicit estimate
of the intertemporal substitution elasticity is 4.2, significantly in excess of 1. Similar
results are reported by Epstein and Zin (1991) for the US. Whether the channels
explored in this paper were in fact behind the sharp deterioration in the trade balance
that followcd Mcxiccis tradc rcforms rcquires a morc in dcpth analytiis than thc15
evidence just mentioned; but these empirical results suggest that the channels
explored in this paper could conceivably have played an important role.
These results have important policy implications. If the trade reform will not be
reversed, but the Government cannot credibly communicate that to the private sector,
consumers effectively trade off the wrong intertemporal prices. AS a consequence,
private savings will be suboptimally low; this justifies policy intervention to increase
private savings. This is a special case of a more general point made by Guíllermo
Calvo (1988): mistaken beliefs about future policy act like a distortion and therefore
justify policy intervention in principle. Increasing private savings should preferably be
done through a temporary increase in consumption taxes. If that is not feasible, a case
can be made for temporary tariffs as a second best response; this would be equivalent
to gradual rather than "cold turkey" trade liberalization.
A magnifying impact could come about if the private savings response leads to
such a large current account deficit that the trade reform itself does in fact get
reversed, a case of self-fulfilling prophecy.'~ This very real possibility further
strengthens the case for policy intervention to increase private savings, and, arguably,
for external support in the early periods of trade reform, possibly through institutions
like the World Bank.16
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